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  Abstract 
 
 
 After a month-long run on American banks, Franklin Delano Roosevelt proclaimed a 
Bank Holiday beginning March 6, 1933 that shut down the banking system. When banks 
reopened on March 13, 1933, depositors stood in line to return their hoarded cash. This paper 
traces the remarkable turnaround in the public’s confidence to the Emergency Banking Act, 
passed by Congress on March 9, 1933. Roosevelt used the emergency currency provisions of the 
Act to prod the Federal Reserve to create de facto deposit insurance in the reopened banks. The 
contemporary press confirms that the public recognized the implicit guarantee, and as a result, 
believed the President’s words in his first Fireside Chat on March 12, 1933, that the reopened 
banks would be safe. The public responded by returning more than half of their hoarded cash to 
the banks within two weeks and by bidding up stock prices on March 15, 1933, the first trading 
day after the Bank Holiday ended, by the largest ever one-day percentage price increase. The 
Bank Holiday and the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 reestablished the integrity of the 
payments system and demonstrated the power of credible regime-shifting policies.    
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On Sunday, March 5, 1933, after a month-long run on American banks, the newly-
inaugurated President of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, proclaimed a four-day 
suspension of all banking transactions beginning the following day. The nation’s stock 
exchanges also closed even though they were not mentioned in the President’s executive order. 
On Thursday, March 9, Roosevelt failed to reopen the banks and extended the closure for an 
additional three days. Americans should have reacted in horror to the President’s dictatorial 
decree, and to his failure to stick to his original schedule. Instead they waited to hear the 
President’s plan.  
Roosevelt’s fifteen-minute radio address to the American people on Sunday evening, 
March 12, his first Fireside Chat, assured the public that only sound banks would be licensed to 
reopen by the U.S. Treasury. He said (New York Times, March 13, 1933, p.1 cont.): “I can 
assure you that it is safer to keep your money in a reopened bank than under the mattress.” And 
much to everyone’s relief, when banks reopened for business on March 13, depositors stood in 
line to return their hoarded cash to neighborhood banks. Within two weeks Americans had re-
deposited more than half of the currency that they had squirreled away before the suspension. 
The stock market registered its approval as well. On March 15, 1933, the first day of trading after 
the extended closure, the New York Stock Exchange recorded the largest one-day percentage 
price increase ever.1 With the benefit of hindsight, the Bank Holiday in March 1933 ended the 
bank runs that had plagued the Great Depression. 
 How did Roosevelt manage to accomplish in one week what Herbert Hoover failed to do 
in three years?  
Contemporary observers considered the Bank Holiday and the Fireside Chat a one-two 
punch that broke the back of the Great Depression. According to Beard and Smith (1940, p.78), 
                                                 
1 See Siegel (1998, pp. 183). 
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“the sudden nationwide holiday performed the same function for the bank panic as may a slap in 
the face for a person gripped by unreasoning hysteria.” Allen (1939, p. 111) observes that the 
bank reopening succeeded because “the people had been catapulted and persuaded by a president 
who seemed to believe in them and was giving them action. . . .” Alter (2006, p.269) confirms 
the importance of Roosevelt’s communication skills by quoting Will Rogers on the President’s 
description of the reopening: “He made everyone understand it, even the bankers.”   
Roosevelt’s oratory certainly played an important role, but only the financially naive 
would have believed that the government could examine thousands of banks in one week and 
identify those that should survive. According to Wigmore (1987, p.752), “The federal review 
procedure for reopening banks also had too many weaknesses to create much confidence, given 
the number of banks reopened, the speed with which they opened, and the lack of current 
information on them. There were no standards for judging which banks should reopen.” Thus 
Temin and Wigmore (1990, p. 491) dismiss the importance of the Bank Holiday by saying: “The 
value of stocks . . . rose sharply from its trough in March – at the time of the Bank Holiday – to a 
peak in July. . . .This abrupt turnaround was hardly the result of the interregnum or the Bank 
Holiday itself. They contained bad news about the health of the economy. Only after Roosevelt’s 
commitment to inflationary policies became clear during the Hundred Days did the value of 
stocks rise. The stock market rose and fell with the value of the dollar during 1933, illustrating 
dramatically the link between devaluation and expectations for the economy.”  
Temin and Wigmore ignore the March 15, 1933, stock price increase in their assessment 
of the Bank Holiday. They go further and state (1990, p. 488-9): “[F]or the first month the 
administration was absorbed with the Bank Holiday and preparing for action. Stock, bond, 
foreign exchange, and commodities markets were quiet and little changed [italics added].” 
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My evidence shows that the Bank Holiday that began on March 6, 1933, marked the end 
of the old regime and the Fireside Chat a week later inaugurated a new one. The Emergency 
Banking Act passed by Congress on March 9, 1933, combined with the Federal Reserve’s 
commitment to supply unlimited amounts of currency to reopened banks, created de facto 
deposit insurance, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983, p. 417). I show that people recognized this 
guarantee and, as a result, believed the President’s words on March 12, 1933, that the reopened 
banks would be safer than the proverbial ‘money under the mattress.’ Confirmation of the 
turnaround in expectations came in two parts: (1) The Dow-Jones industrial average rose by a 
statistically significant 15.34 percent on March 15, 1933, taking account of the two-week trading 
halt during the Bank Holiday; and (2) By the end of the month the public had returned to the 
banks two-thirds of the currency it had hoarded since the onset of the panic.  
The Emergency Banking Act and the de facto inauguration of deposit insurance created a 
safety net for banks and produced a regime shift with instantaneous results, similar to Sargent’s 
(1986) description of “The Ends of Four Big Inflations.” This would come as no surprise to 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 434), who say that “Federal insurance of bank deposits was the 
most important structural change in the banking system to result from the 1933 panic, and … the 
structural change most conducive to monetary stability since state bank notes were taxed out of 
existence immediately after the Civil War.”2  But Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 421-422) 
simply review the provisions of the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 and do not recognize the 
implicit guarantee for deposits in the reopened banks. Meltzer (2003, p. 423) says that the 
                                                 
2 The Banking Act of 1933, which included a provision for creating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, was 
passed on June 13, 1933, and insurance (which was not retroactive) became effective on January 1, 1934. Roosevelt 
himself opposed deposit insurance legislation (Calomiris and White, p. 193) but I show below that this did not 
interfere with his commitment to the success of de facto depositor protection that began with the Emergency 
Banking Act.   
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York understood the need to guarantee deposits in reopened banks 
but fails to show that the public recognized this new policy, and acted accordingly.3  
The nationwide Bank Holiday in March 1933 was a unique event in American financial 
history. Banks’ had suspended the convertibility of deposits into currency before, but never had 
there been a complete stoppage in the payments system of the entire country. The evidence 
presented here on the speed with which the Bank Holiday and the Emergency Banking Act of 
1933 reestablished the integrity of the payments system demonstrates the power of credible 
regime-shifting policies.     
This paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the February 1933 crisis in the 
banking system that culminated in the formal suspension of all banking transactions when FDR 
proclaimed the nationwide Bank Holiday. Section 2 reviews the reasons for the suspension, and 
Section 3 presents the solution to the crisis: the March 9 Emergency Banking Act. Evidence from 
the contemporary press confirms that an important segment of the public understood the implicit 
federal guarantee for deposits of reopened banks. Section 4 shows that people responded by re-
depositing the currency they had withdrawn and by bidding up stock prices.     
 
I. The Collapse 
   “The straw that broke the camel’s back occurred in Detroit, Michigan” in February 
1933, according to the then Acting Comptroller of the Currency Francis Awalt (1969, p. 349).  
Michigan Governor William A. Comstock declared a state-wide banking holiday on February 14, 
1933, to prevent a collapse of the Union Guardian Trust Company of Detroit, a bank with close 
ties to Henry Ford. The story of the battle between Ford, Union Guardian’s largest depositor, and 
                                                 
3 Wicker (1996, p. 146) simply asserts “the government guaranteed the soundness of each of the reopened banks,” 
but offers no proof and also fails to show that the public understood the new policy.    
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Arthur Ballantine, Under Secretary of the Treasury, over how to save the bank from insolvency 
has been told many times (Kennedy [1973], Wigmore [1985] and Wicker [1996]). The failure of 
Ford and Ballantine to arrive at a mutually agreeable solution forced the Governor to suspend 
banking operations in the entire state. The fallout from that decision gave new meaning to the 
law of unintended consequences. Instead of preventing a panic, the Michigan bank holiday 
precipitated a nationwide rush into cash.    
Michigan was not the first state to declare a bank holiday during the Great Depression. 
Nevada Lieutenant Governor Morley Griswold declared a twelve day holiday in the state 
beginning November 1, 1932 (New York Times, November 2, 1932, p. 1). But paralyzing 
financial services in Detroit carried far more weight than shutting down banks in Reno. The 
Washington Post (November 7, 1932, p. 3) reported that “gambling was the hardest hit 
business,” by the Nevada decree but then qualifies the dislocation by saying “Eastern divorce 
seekers were the luckiest [because] they had resources in their home cities upon which they 
called.”  
The damage of the February 14, 1933 Michigan proclamation came from the contagion. 
According to Wicker (1996, p. 121), the Michigan bank holiday “spread fear and uncertainty 
quickly to the contiguous states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.” The contemporary press suggests, 
however, that those states recognized the danger of imitating the Michigan example. On 
February 17, the office of Ohio Governor George White issued a statement saying (New York 
Times, February 18, 1933, p. 5): “There is no occasion for a proclamation by Governor White of 
a banking holiday in the state of Ohio.” On February 23, the New York Times reported (p. C31) 
that Indiana Governor Paul McNutt declared there will be “no bank moratorium in Indiana” in 
order to quiet “unwarranted reports from Chicago that there would be [one].” 
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 Unlike Michigan’s Midwestern neighbors, however, Maryland failed to hold the line. On 
February 24 Governor Albert Ritchie said (New York Times, February 24, 1933, p. 21): “I 
attended [t]he meeting of bankers this evening with the idea of doing whatever is best for the 
depositors. . . . I believe there is no justification for the withdrawals which have recently been 
taking place. But to protect the property and saving[s] of the people of the city [of Baltimore] 
and the State these large withdrawals should stop. It was the consensus of opinion that a bank 
holiday should be declared tomorrow.”  
The data confirm large increases in the demand for currency in the weeks following the 
Michigan moratorium. Table 1 shows weekly figures for currency in circulation for the first six 
months of 1933. For the six weeks ending February 8, 1933, currency outstanding was quite 
stable and averaged $5.36 billion. After February 8, currency held by the public rose steadily, 
reaching $7.25 billion in the week ending March 8, 1933. The $1.78 billion jump in currency 
held by the public between February 8 and March 8, an increase of more than 30 percent, 
confirms the hoarding of cash.4 Almost all of that increase occurred after February 15.    
The rush to cash during the weeks following the Michigan bank holiday triggered bank 
closures or deposit restrictions in every state even before FDR’s proclamation of March 5, 1933 
(see Wicker, 1996, p. 128). According to the New York Times (March 5, 1933, p. F24), “A bank 
holiday ‘until further notice’ was declared tonight [March 4] in Delaware, the last of the forty-
eight states in which restrictions have been made.” But there is disagreement over the precise 
number of bank holidays in force before Roosevelt’s presidential decree. Friedman and Schwarz 
(1963, p. 325) write “By March 3, holidays in about half the states had been declared;” Meltzer 
                                                 
4 The data are not seasonally adjusted, but currency in circulation for the corresponding weeks in each of the three 
previous years show a slight decline. For example, in 1932 currency circulation declined from $5.34 billion in the 
second week of February to $5.26 billion in the second week of March (Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics, 
pp.384-7, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington D.C.).    
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(2003, p. 382) writes “By inauguration day [March 4], thirty-five states had declared bank 
holidays;” and Alter (2006, p. 190) writes “By the early evening of Friday March 3, banks in 
thirty-two of forty-eight states were closed.” Why is there such confusion?  
To some extent the disagreement stems from the use of different sources or time periods, 
but only Wicker provides a reference for his discussion (the New York Times). The more likely 
source of confusion is that some states went to great lengths to avoid a de jure holiday. For 
example, the Chicago Tribune (March 5, 1933, p. A5) reported: “Indiana Governor Paul V. 
McNutt today informed state officials…[that] Indiana banks, under the new bank code law 
recently rushed through the state legislature, have the power to limit withdrawals to one-tenth of 
one percent. Therefore, no state-wide bank moratorium will be declared in Indiana.”  
A detailed examination of the Associated Press’s list of banking restrictions by state 
(including the District of Columbia), as of the close of business, March 4, 1933, shows the 
following (New York Times, March 5, 1933, p. F24): Banks in 28 states are ‘closed’; Banks in 
10 states are ‘some or mostly closed’; Banks in 11 states have deposits that are ‘restricted to 
withdrawals of 5 (or some unspecified) percent’. The Associated Press characterized Indiana as: 
“About half [of the banks] restricted to 5 percent [withdrawals] indefinitely.” If the term bank 
holiday means an unqualified shut down of banking transactions by state governments, then the 
Associated Press limits the number to twenty-eight.5  
Franklin Delano Roosevelt obviously did not invent the bank holiday. So why is his 
March 5 proclamation credited with launching a process that was crucial to restoring confidence 
in America’s banking system? Roosevelt’s initiative turned a maze of state restrictions into a 
                                                 
5 Although the Associated Press lists New York as ‘Closed’, the New York Times [March 5, 1933, p. 23] reports: 
“At least two banks in New York City did not avail themselves of the banking holiday proclaimed yesterday by 
Governor Lehman. They were the Sterling National Bank, 1410 Broadway and the National Bank of Far 
Rockaway.”   
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uniform national policy. This was the key first step to resolving the banking crisis: It shifted the 
responsibility for the integrity of the payments system to the Federal government, where it 
belonged.  
 
II. The Problem  
 Franklin Roosevelt’s problem was how to reopen the banks without triggering a 
resumption of deposit withdrawals that led to the suspensions. The Bank Holiday was a more 
extensive form of bank suspension that had last occurred in the United States in 1907, under the 
national banking system. But Congress had established the Federal Reserve System in 1913 
precisely to prevent banks from suspending the convertibility of deposits into currency. 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 330) compare the Bank Holiday with earlier restrictions by 
saying, “One would be hard put to . . .find a more dramatic example of how far the result of 
legislation can deviate from intention.” 
 Why did the system fail in 1933?  
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p.330) admit that, even with the benefit of hindsight, “the  
answer is by no means clear.” However, a number of points are worth considering.6  First, the 
weakened capital position of the commercial banks made them vulnerable to even minor drains. 
Second, the public’s demand for currency during February and March 1933 was exacerbated by 
a demand for gold.7 Third, although the Federal Reserve Act provided for an elastic currency by 
allowing a Reserve Bank to discount eligible commercial paper and ship currency in the form of 
Federal Reserve Notes to a commercial bank, the Act also imposed a reserve requirement of 40 
                                                 
6 See Meltzer (2003, pp. 381-389) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 324-332).  
7 According to Wigmore (1987, p. 744), weekly data show a $1.8 billion increase in currency in circulation and a 
gold drain of $563 million from the Federal Reserve System. He also provides daily data showing a larger gold 
outflow from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the first few days of March.  
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percent gold backing for Federal Reserve Notes outstanding. Fourth, by March 3, 1933 the gold 
drain at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York reduced its gold reserve ratio to 24 percent. 
Meltzer (2003, p. 387) says that the Federal Reserve Board then suspended the gold reserve 
requirement but quotes the Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, George 
Harrison, saying (Meltzer 2003, p.386) that “he would not take the responsibility of running [the] 
bank with deficient reserves.” Perhaps Wicker (1996, p.145) sums up the situation best: “[Using] 
the pre-1914 remedy of suspension of cash payments can be explained quite easily. Bold and 
courageous leadership was absent. Neither the Fed nor the RFC (Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation) was willing to accept lender of last resort responsibilities.”  
 The absence of leadership created a vacuum filled with fear and uncertainty, making the 
reopening process a precarious undertaking. According to Acting Comptroller of the Currency 
Francis Awalt (1969, p. 368), “No one knew how the public would react when the banks 
reopened. If they demanded their money they either had to have it or the reopening would be a 
failure.”  
To prevent a resumption of bank withdrawals the President appealed directly to the 
people on March 12, 1933, in his first Fireside Chat. His opening words set the tone:8 “My 
friends, I want to talk for few minutes with the people of the United States about banking – with 
the comparatively few who understand the mechanics of banking, but more particularly with the 
overwhelming majority of you who use banks for the making of deposits and the drawing of 
checks. I want to tell you what has been done in the last few days, and why it was done, and what 
the next steps are going to be.” In clear and simple terms Roosevelt explained the procedure for 
re-opening the banks and claimed that only sound banks would be re-opened.  
                                                 
8 The text of the Fireside Chat, and the quotes in the next few sentences, can be found in the New York Times, 
March 13, 1933, p. 1.   
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The novelty of this event is captured by the description, the day after the talk, in the 
Christian Science Monitor (March 13, 1933, p. 1): “He speaks to the nation over the radio in 
what is quite possibly the most remarkable address ever made by any President. In man-to-man 
fashion, in words of only one syllable, he uses the tones of a friend on the inside to assure a 
people … that the bank situation is sound. He recites the problems [and] explains the remedy: 
‘when people find they can get their money when they want it the phantom of fear will soon be 
laid [to rest] ... It was the government’s job to straighten out this situation and the job is being 
performed.’”  
Frederick Lewis Allen, the contemporary social historian, confirmed the power of FDR’s 
oratory (Allen, 1939, p. 110): “Roosevelt’s first Fireside Chat was perfectly attuned. Quiet, 
uncondescending [sic], clear, and confident, it was an incredibly skillful performance.” But Allen 
also emphasized that most people did not understand how the government could accomplish its 
objective (Allen, 1939, p.110): “The banks opened without any such renewed panic as had been 
feared. They might not have done so had the people realized that it was impossible, in a few 
days, to separate the sound banks from the unsound.”  
 Allen suggests that most people did not care what the President said, only how he said it. 
But the President’s opening words identified two groups of people, the “comparatively few who 
understand the mechanics of banking … [and] the overwhelming majority.” How did the 
President assure the more sophisticated public -- and a skeptical press -- who could blow the 
whistle if there was no substance to his promises?         
Roosevelt, in fact, delivered a double-barreled message during his Fireside Chat -- one 
for the common man and one for the financiers. To those who understood the mechanics of 
banking he said: “Last Thursday [March 9] was the legislation promptly and patriotically passed 
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by the Congress . . . [that] gave authority to develop a program of rehabilitation of our banking 
facilities. . . .  The new law allows the twelve Federal Reserve Banks to issue additional currency 
on good assets and thus the banks that reopen will be able to meet every legitimate call. The new 
currency is being sent out by the Bureau of engraving and Printing to every part of the country.”  
The Emergency Banking Act, passed by Congress on March 9, 1933, gave the President 
the ammunition needed to insure the safety of the reopened banks.9    
 
III. The Emergency Banking Act of 1933 
 The key provision of the Act, mentioned by Roosevelt, allowed the Federal Reserve 
Banks to issue emergency currency, similar to Aldrich-Vreeland currency issued in 1914. 
According to the New York Times (March 9, 1933, p. 2): “To many of the President’s closest 
advisors the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, repealed when the Federal Reserve Act came into effect, 
provides the model scheme for the projected expansion of currency through Federal Reserve 
Notes.”10 But Titles I through IV of the Emergency Banking Act went much further, granting the 
President near dictatorial powers. 
 Title I of the Act approved the President’s declaration of the Bank Holiday and allowed 
the President, during the period of emergency, to regulate all banking functions, including “any 
transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit between or payments by banking institutions 
as defined by the President, and export, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin.” 
Title II gave the Comptroller of the Currency the power to restrict the operations of a bank with 
                                                 
9 The text of the Act appears in its entirety in the New York Times, March 10, 1933, p. 2.   
10 The emergency currency provision of Aldrich-Vreeland Act, passed in May 1908 to prevent a replay of the Panic 
of 1907, had been scheduled to expire by legislative design on June 30, 1914. The Federal Reserve Act, passed in 
December 1913, extended the expiration date for one year, until June 30, 1915, to provide protection against panics 
while the Federal Reserve System was organized. The extension allowed Treasury Secretary William McAdoo to 
invoke the Aldrich Vreeland Act to prevent a panic in August 1914 at the outbreak of the Great War (see Silber 
2007b).    
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impaired assets and to appoint a Conservator, who “shall take possession of the books, records, 
and assets of every description of such bank, and take such action as may be necessary to 
conserve the assets of such bank pending further disposition of its business.” Title III allowed the 
Secretary of the Treasury to determine whether a bank needed additional funds to operate and 
“with the approval of the President request the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to subscribe 
to the preferred stock in such association, State bank or trust company, or to make loans secured 
by such stock as collateral.” Title IV provided for the issuance of emergency currency by the 
Federal Reserve Banks, called Federal Reserve Bank Notes, backed either by “(A) any direct 
obligations of the United States or (B) any notes, drafts, bills of exchange, or bankers’ 
acceptances, acquired under the provisions of this act.” Federal Reserve Bank Notes would 
circulate alongside normal Federal Reserve Notes, even though they were not backed by gold, 
because the Act provided that the new notes “shall be receivable at par in all parts of the United 
States . . .and shall be redeemable in lawful money of the United States on presentation at the 
United States Treasury.”       
Title I of the Emergency Banking Act conferred considerable power on the President in 
dealing with the crisis. The Administration did not shy away from using those powers. In his 
Fireside Chat on Sunday night, March 12, Roosevelt ordered banks to be opened sequentially 
(New York Times, March 13, 1933, p.1 cont.): “First in the Twelve Reserve Bank cities – those 
banks which on first examination by the Treasury have been already found to be all right . . . 
followed on Tuesday . . . by banks already found to be sound in cities where there are recognized 
clearing houses . . . [and] on Wednesday and succeeding days, banks in smaller places, . . . 
subject, of course to the government’s physical ability to complete its survey.” The Treasury 
issued emergency regulations designed to prevent runs on the reopened banks, including (New 
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York Times, March 13, 1933, p.2): “No banking institution shall permit any withdrawal by any 
person when such institution, acting in good faith, shall deem that the withdrawal is intended for 
hoarding.”  
Roosevelt recognized that the most important ingredient for a successful reopening was 
the restoration of confidence. He said (New York Times, March 13, 1933, p.1 cont.): 
“Confidence and courage are the essentials of success in carrying out our plan.” Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963, p. 440) confirm the role of confidence: “Panics arose out of or were greatly 
intensified by a loss of confidence in the ability of banks to convert deposits into currency.” But 
Roosevelt did not generate great confidence when he said the first banks to be reopened were 
those that “on first examination by the Treasury have been already found to be all right.” Nor did 
regulations against hoarding assure people that the banks were sound; if anything the reverse is 
more likely. The key to creating confidence in the reopened banks rested with Titles III and IV of 
the Emergency Banking Act.  
Title IV gave the Federal Reserve the flexibility to issue emergency currency, Federal 
Reserve Bank Notes, backed by any assets of a commercial bank. The contemporary press 
recognized the power of the emergency currency provision (New York Times (March 10, 1933, 
p. 3): “The new currency feature of the law is one of the most important of the many 
extraordinary powers given to this administration … which stem from the Aldrich-Vreeland Act . 
. . invoked in 1914 for the issuance of about $386,000,000 in emergency currency.” The link to 
Aldrich-Vreeland currency, which succeeded in defusing the financial crisis at the outbreak of 
World War I, conferred credibility on the power of Title IV of the Emergency Banking Act of 
1933.11 The Wall Street Journal (March 10, 1933, p.1 cont.) wrote: “. . . Banks which are 
believed to be 100% sound would be reopened as soon as their condition could be checked . . . 
                                                 
11 See Silber (2007a) for a discussion of the 1914 financial crisis.  
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All banks so reopened, it was pointed out, could under Title 4 and under machinery already in 
existence obtain the cash resources necessary from the Federal Reserve banks.”   
  Title IV of the Emergency Banking Act promised more than just the availability of cash 
to reopened banks. It also created the expectation that the government would guarantee 
depositors against loss. The New York Times wrote (March 13, 1933, p.1, cont.): “Some bankers 
who were here today . . . interpreted the emergency banking act as a measure under which the 
government practically guarantees, not officially but morally, the deposits in the banks which it 
permits to reopen. This point of view was based on the fact that banks permitted to open are 
characterized as 100 per cent sound and assured of sufficient currency to meet all obligations.”  
Title III of the Emergency Banking Act added to the public’s perception of a guarantee, 
according to the March 13 New York Times article: “The privilege to be extended to banks to 
issue preferred stock to be taken over by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation when they are 
in need of funds for capital purposes or reorganization, is also pointed to as another feature of the 
governmental program which fits in with the theory that a virtual guarantee is extended to 
depositors.” Two days earlier, a New York Times headline had announced (New York Times, 
March 11, 1933, p. 2): “Deposit Guarantee Seen in Bank Law,” and attributed the view to “an 
interpretation of the measure . . . by some officials in one of the government departments it 
concerns.” 
The availability of capital funds through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation would 
certainly help a bank’s balance sheet, but only the Federal Reserve could provide unlimited 
currency to banks to meet a run on deposits. Acting Comptroller of the Currency Awalt 
confirmed the implicit guarantee many years later, but also hinted at concern over Federal 
Reserve support (1969, p. 368): “It was felt that the various Federal Reserve Banks must back 
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the reopened banks to the hilt, and that it was no time for any conservative head of a Federal 
Reserve Bank to exercise his conservatism, should demand be made for currency. We reasoned, 
therefore, that if the Federal Reserve agreed to a reopening of a particular bank, it would 
necessarily be forced to back it one hundred percent.”  
How could a conservative Federal Reserve throttle the guarantee? 
A bank in need of cash could get the new Federal Reserve Bank Notes, according to Title 
IV of the Emergency Banking Act, by discounting with its regional Federal Reserve Bank “(A) 
any direct obligations of the United States or (B) any notes, drafts, bills of exchange, or bankers’ 
acceptances, acquired under the provisions of this act.” But an individual Federal Reserve Bank 
could refuse to accept a bank’s assets as collateral if the assets were considered too risky. Central 
bankers always worry about credit risk. The Federal Reserve Banks may have been especially 
sensitive since they are private corporations owned by the commercial banks that are members of 
the System. Emanuel A. Goldenweiser, the Director of Research and Statistics at the Federal 
Reserve Board from 1926 though 1945, in a discussion entitled, “Tragic Interlude in March, 
1933,” said (1951, p. 165): “[T]he Federal Reserve Banks and their management were still under 
the spell of commercial banking practice and theory and were dominated by the concept of 
liquidity as protection to a bank. They were also concerned about protecting the liquidity and 
solvency of the Federal Reserve Banks themselves as custodians of the country’s ultimate 
reserves.” 
An agreement to protect the Federal Reserve Banks against losses insured their 
cooperation in lending freely to banks in need of cash. According to Meltzer (2003, p.423n) “The 
Treasury wanted 100 percent of the deposits available and agreed to indemnify the reserve banks 
against losses.” The promise to indemnify the Reserve Banks against losses came in the form of 
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a telegram, dated March 11, 1933, from Roosevelt’s Treasury secretary, William Woodin, to 
Governor George Harrison of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, quoting President 
Roosevelt (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Archives, Central Files Unit, 017.1): “It is 
inevitable that some losses may be made by the Federal Reserve banks in loans to their member 
banks. The country appreciates, however, that the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks are 
operating entirely under Federal Law and the recent Emergency Bank Act greatly enlarges their 
powers to adapt their facilities to a national emergency. Therefore, there is definitely an 
obligation on the federal government to reimburse the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks for 
losses which they may make on loans made under these emergency powers. I do not hesitate to 
assure you that I shall ask the Congress to indemnify any of the 12 Federal Reserve banks for 
such losses. I am confident that Congress will recognize its obligation to these Federal Banks 
should the occasion arise, and grant such request.”12 Roosevelt clearly went out on a limb to 
insure the Federal Reserve’s cooperation.   
Congress understood the role of emergency currency in guaranteeing bank deposits. The 
New York Times wrote (March 13, 1933, p. 1 cont.): “…the framing and adoption of the 
emergency banking law . . . went far to offset demands in Congress for a separate guarantee 
bill.” Of course, the public did not know the details of the Federal Reserve’s reluctance to lend, 
nor did it know of Roosevelt’s indemnification scheme.13  Most of the people in America, in fact, 
                                                 
12 The Honorable Ogden Mills, outgoing Treasury secretary, was invited to the Board of Directors meeting of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to read the telegram and to brief the Directors on “recent discussions of the 
problems involved in reopening the banks of the country which have taken place in Washington , D.C.” (Minutes, 
March 11, 1933, p. 179, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Archives). William Woodin, the incoming Treasury 
secretary, had asked Mills to stay on and help draft the Emergency Banking Act. Also see Alter (2006, pp. 228-230) 
and Meltzer (2003, pp. 421-427) for a discussion of the role Mills played.    
13 The Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Minutes, March 12, 1933, p. 189, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York Archives) were sufficiently worried about the riskiness of loans to reopened banks that they 
transmitted the following resolution to the Treasury secretary: “Pending the legal assumption of the responsibility of 
the government [to indemnify the Reserve Banks]. . . we believe that banks should be licensed to reopen only with 
our approval, as the principal burden of taking care of such banks as are reopened will be ours.”     
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did not read the New York Times, so they were unaware of the publicity accorded the implicit 
guarantee. 
Perhaps the articles in the New York Times reflected the strategy outlined by Raymond 
Moley, a member of FDR’s Brain Trust. Moley had worked with Treasury secretary William 
Woodin in formulating the Emergency Banking Act and had helped draft the March 12 Fireside 
Chat. He said (Moley 1939, p.155): “Those who conceived and executed . . .the policies which 
vanquished the bank crisis . . .  were intent upon rallying the confidence, first, of the conservative 
business and banking leaders of the country and then, through them, of the public generally.”  
Suggestive evidence of the strategy described by Moley comes from comparing the 
Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York with the words that 
appeared in the New York Times. On March 10, 1933, the following entry appeared in the 
Minutes (p.172, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Archives): “Under this law, enacted as a 
part of the program for reopening the banks, the Federal Reserve Banks become in effect 
guarantors of the deposits of the reopened banks. While they are not legally bound there is a 
large moral responsibility [italics added].” Two days later the New York Times echoed precisely 
that sentiment (March 13, 1933, p. 1 cont.): “Some bankers who were here today . . . interpreted 
the emergency banking act as a measure under which the government practically guarantees, not 
officially but morally, [italics added] the deposits in the banks which it permits to re-open.” 
There is no evidence of a purposeful leak, but Treasury secretary William Woodin had been a 
member of the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York until March 3, 
1933, and could have easily arranged a discrete disclosure.14  
                                                 
14 This tactic is consistent with the approach of the new administration. Alter (2006, pp. 179 -181) confirms 
Roosevelt’s Machiavellian side by documenting his failure to cooperate with Hoover in the month before the 
election. He suggests (p.181): “It is hard to avoid the conclusion that [Roosevelt] intentionally allowed the economy 
to sink lower so that he could enter the presidency in a more dramatic fashion.”     
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To sum up: The contemporary commentary suggests that FDR’s rhetoric in his first 
Fireside Chat gave the public confidence in the opened banks. Business and banking leaders -- 
and the press – could rely on the Emergency Banking Act to deliver on the government’s moral 
obligation to guarantee deposits.  The key question is: When the banks reopened, did the public 
behave as though it believed in the newly-guaranteed safety of the banking system?   
 
Section IV. The Evidence 
On the very first day the banks reopened, the press described depositors anxious to 
redeposit their cash. A front page headline in the Chicago Tribune read (March 14, 1933): “City 
Recovers Confidence as 34 Banks Open.” The front page of the New York Times carried similar 
news: “Rush to Put Money Back Shows Restored Faith as Holiday Ends.” The Times article 
explains: “The public plainly showed that it recovered from the fear and hysteria which 
characterized the last few days before the banking holiday was proclaimed. It was obvious that 
the people had full confidence in the banks which received licenses to reopen from the Federal 
Reserve Bank…there was a general ‘run’ yesterday [March 13] to deposit or redeposit money . . 
. . Conditions in New York were duplicated in each of the other Federal Reserve cities 
throughout the country where full banking facilities were restored.” The process continued the 
following day, according to the Times (March 15, 1933, p. 5): “With the reopening of the banks 
in clearing house centers . . . currency poured in from private hoards and from the tills of 
business houses to be deposited in the banks.”  
The success of the reopening had the somewhat anomalous result of making the 
emergency currency appear redundant. On March 15, a headline announced (New York Times, 
March 15, 1933, p. 5): “New Currency Put at $2,000,000,000: Bureau made first Delivery of 
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Money 24 Hours after Receiving Order.” The newspaper then concluded: “If this movement [of 
returning currency] keeps up, bankers remarked, only a comparatively small amount of the new 
Federal Reserve Bank Notes will be needed to supplement the existing supplies of regular 
currency.” The public’s behavior supports the old banker adage: “When they know they can get 
their money, they are not so eager to have it.”15   
The data on currency in circulation in Table I support the descriptive comments in the 
press. Currency held by the public had increased by $1.78 billion in the four weeks ending 
March 8, 1933. The public returned two-thirds of the increase, $1.18 billion, by the end of the 
month.16 This remarkable turnaround is all the more impressive considering that when the 
government’s initial  licensing program ended on April 12, 1933, a total of 4,215 banks, with 
deposits of nearly $4 billion, remained closed (Wicker, 1996, pp. 146-147).  
The stock market provides a second assessment of the events from March 3, 1933, the 
last trading day before the Bank Holiday, to March 15, 1933, the day the New York Stock 
Exchange resumed trading. The Dow-Jones Industrial Average increased by a record 15.43 
percent on March 15, 1933, the largest one-day percentage price increase ever recorded, 
according to Siegel (1998, p. 183). However, Siegel omits this day from his ranking of largest 
daily stock price increases, presumably because trading had been suspended for almost two 
calendar weeks. Recall that Temin and Wigmore (1990, p. 488) dismiss entirely the March 15 
price increase by saying that the market was quiet and little changed. Is the 15.34 percent jump 
in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average on March 15, 1933, significant?  
                                                 
15 The quote comes from the Wall Street Journal, September 15, 1914, p. 5 and refers to British investors not 
liquidating their American investments as the crisis of 1914 came under control. See Silber 2007a, p.128.  
16The data are not seasonally adjusted, but the changes in currency in circulation for the corresponding weeks in 
each of the three previous years are small and show no pattern. In 1932 currency circulation declined from $5.26 
billion in the second week of March to $5.15 billion in the last week of March. In 1931 currency in circulation rose 
from $4.27 billion to $4.33 billion and in 1930 currency in circulation rose from $4.21 billion to $4.23 billion 
(Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics, pp.384-7, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Washington D.C.).     
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I use a t-test on the continuously compound return of 14.27 percent on March 15, 1933, 
to determine whether this increase is statistically significant. To get a measure of the normal 
variability of returns during this period I first calculate the daily standard deviation of returns 
(continuously compounded) on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average from January 4, 1932 through 
March 3, 1933. I then split the sample on November 8, 1932, the date of Roosevelt’s election, 
and perform an F-test to determine whether the pre-election (January 4, 1932 through November 
7, 1932) daily standard deviation of 3.45% equals the post election (November 9, 1932 through 
March 3, 1933) daily standard deviation of 2.48%. The F-statistic equals 2.03, with 213 and 77 
degrees of freedom, implying a p-value of .001. Thus I reject the hypothesis of equality for the 
pre- and post-election standard deviation of returns. I use the post-election standard deviation of 
2.48% to form the t-statistic for the return of 14.27% between March 3, 1933, and March 15, 
1933, allowing for eight regular trading days between the two dates.17 The t-statistic has a value 
of 2.03, which is significant at conventional levels.18  
Table II shows the same set of statistics for three other stock market indices: the S&P500 
(which consisted of 90 stocks at that time); the CRSP equally weighted index; and the CRSP 
value weighted index. The t-statistics for the Bank Holiday returns using the CRSP indices allow 
for 10 trading days between the two dates because, unlike the Dow-Jones Industrial Average and 
the S&P500, the CRSP data include the abbreviated Saturday sessions.19 All of the t-statistics are 
significant. 
                                                 
17 Daily data on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (and the estimate of the 2.48 standard deviation) did not include 
the abbreviated Saturday trading sessions. The eight trading days between March 3 and March 15 excludes 
Saturdays.   
18 Recognizing that variance over non-trading days is lower than variance over days when trading takes place  (see 
French and Roll [1986] and Lockwood and Linn [1990]) would increase the t-statistic.     
19 The reduced daily standard deviations for the CRSP indices compared with the S&P500 and the Dow-Jones are 
due, in part, to the lower standard deviation of returns on the abbreviated Saturday sessions compared with the rest 
of the week.   
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Contemporary America viewed the stock market’s response to the Bank Holiday and the 
successful reopening of the banking system as signaling a turning point in expectations about the 
prospects for economic recovery. The day after the market reopened, the New York Times 
(March 16, 1933, p. 25) wrote: “The robust advance in stocks and bonds was interpreted – and 
correctly so – as Wall Street’s mark of approval of the steps taken by the President and Congress 
in the interval to end the financial disorder.” The Wall Street Journal (March 16, 1933, p. 6) 
added: “Reopening of the New York Stock Exchange on Wednesday free of price restrictions 
and the demonstration that took place there of returning popular confidence in the economic 
future of the United States make an important contribution to the struggle for economic recovery. 
. . . The emergency banking act lifted from security and commodity markets an enormous weight 
of potential liquidation. That statute and the related powers invoked by the Administration 
reversed the hoarding impulse; in consequence an important body of liquid capital has been 
released. And the Chicago Tribune waxed eloquent in its assessment (March 16, 1933, p. 1): 
“The zooming upward of prices on the reopened stock markets today is regarded as barometrical 
indication of the economic weather test that is settling in. Believing the bedrock bottom of the 
depression had been reached from which there was nowhere to go but up and that higher prices 
are in sight, thousands of investors and speculators rushed forth to get in on the ground floor. . . . 
The courage, determination, and resourcefulness of the new President have apparently taken the 
country by storm. The reopening of the banks with deposits everywhere exceeding withdrawals 
crowned with success the first action taken by the administration.”20  
 
                                                 
20 The press cited a second factor buoying stock prices: Favorable congressional legislation giving Roosevelt the 
power to reduce veteran’s benefits and federal salaries. According to the Chicago Tribune (March 16, 1933, p. 1): 
What the country is witnessing is a president doing swiftly and certainly what the overwhelming majority of the 
people demanded . . . No sooner had he ended the bank panic than Mr. Roosevelt began pushing through Congress 
the bill for a 500 million dollar reduction in the cost of the federal government and the bill to legalize and tax beer.”    
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V. Conclusion 
 Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Bank Holiday succeeded for a number of reasons: (1) It 
placed the responsibility for safeguarding the integrity of the payments system with the Federal 
government; (2) Congress passed the Emergency Banking Act and gave the President the power 
to restore confidence in the banking system by guaranteeing deposits; (3) The President did not 
hesitate to use those powers to end the crisis.   
 We can draw three main conclusions from this episode: (1) Crisis management 
requires bold and decisive action; (2) Rhetoric alone will not solve the problem; there must be a 
substantive component to restore normal function; (3) The speed with which the Bank Holiday 
and the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 reestablished the integrity of the payments system 
demonstrates the power of credible regime-shifting policies.    
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Table 1 
Currency in Circulation: 1933 
(in billions) 
 
 
 Jan 4 5.38 
 11 5.30 
 18 5.32 
 25 5.32 
Feb 1 5.37 
 8 5.47 
 15 5.56 
 22 5.70 
Mar 1 6.43 
 8 7.25 
 15 6.98 
 22 6.32 
 29 6.07 
Apr 5 5.97 
 12 5.86 
 19 5.78 
 26 5.71 
May 3 5.67 
 10 5.67 
 17 5.57 
 24 5.51 
 31 5.53 
June 7 5.48 
 14 5.44 
 21 5.41 
 28 5.39 
July 5 5.47 
 12 5.38 
 19 5.35 
 26 5.31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Banking and Monetary Statistics, p. 387.   
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,  
Washington D.C. 1943. 
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Table II 
Significance Tests for Stock Returns: March 3, 1933 to March 15, 1933 
(All data are continuously compounded) 
 
 
 
 (1) 
DJIA 
(2) 
S&P 500 
(3) 
CRSP (EW) 
(4) 
CRSP (VW) 
Return over Bank Holiday 14.27% 15.37% 18.48% 14.41% 
Post-Election Stdv of Returns 2.48% 2.45% 1.81% 1.94% 
t-statistic  (with 8 trading days) 2.03 2.22 - - 
t-statistic (with 10 trading days) - - 3.23 2.35 
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